PL EN
PRACA ORYGINALNA
Porównanie niemieckiej, szwajcarskiej i polskiej reguły fiskalnej przy użyciu symulacji Monte Carlo
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SGH Warsaw School of Economics, Poland
AUTOR DO KORESPONDENCJI
Adam Pigoń   

SGH Warsaw School of Economics, Poland
Data nadesłania: 09-09-2021
Data ostatniej rewizji: 13-12-2021
Data akceptacji: 21-09-2022
Data publikacji: 30-12-2022
 
GNPJE 2022;312(4):17–41
 
SŁOWA KLUCZOWE
KODY KLASYFIKACJI JEL
STRESZCZENIE
W niniejszym artykule oceniamy skutki ekonomiczne istniejących reguł fiskalnych w Polsce, Szwajcarii i Niemczech. W analizie ustalamy związek pomiędzy PKB, dochodami i wydatkami rządowymi, estymując model VAR oparty na danych amerykańskich dla okresu 1960–2015. Nakładamy na te relacje polityki fiskalne implikowane przez daną regułę i analizujemy konsekwencje dla symulowanych ścieżek długu, deficytu i wydatków pod względem stabilności i cykliczności. Stwierdzamy, że reguły szwajcarska i niemiecka są konserwatywne i stabilizują deficyty na niskich poziomach. Może to być jednak niewystarczające do stabilizacji długu w długim okresie w ścisłym sensie. Polska reguła stabilizuje poziom długu na poziomie około 40–50% PKB w długim okresie. Wszystkie reguły implikują antycykliczną politykę fiskalną: relacja deficytu do PKB powodowana zmianami luki PKB wzrasta w całym cyklu koniunkturalnym o maksymalnie 2,2 p.p., 3,3 p.p. i 3,9 p.p. odpowiednio dla reguły polskiej, szwajcarskiej i niemieckiej. Wyniki te można uznać za zadowalające w przypadku reguły szwajcarskiej i niemieckiej.
 
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