PL EN
PRACA ORYGINALNA
Czy wzrost gospodarczy i wyższe wydatki na wojsko są możliwe jednocześnie? Perspektywa endogeniczności
 
Więcej
Ukryj
1
Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw, Poland
 
 
Data nadesłania: 27-12-2022
 
 
Data ostatniej rewizji: 30-04-2023
 
 
Data akceptacji: 12-06-2023
 
 
Data publikacji: 30-06-2023
 
 
Autor do korespondencji
Jacek Lewkowicz   

Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw, Poland
 
 
GNPJE 2023;314(2):28-46
 
SŁOWA KLUCZOWE
KODY KLASYFIKACJI JEL
STRESZCZENIE
Przyczyny i skutki wydatków na cele wojskowe pozostają jednym z kluczowych obszarów geopolityki i debaty publicznej. Często stwierdza się, że zwiększenie budżetu na obronność może pobudzić gospodarkę poprzez zwiększenie produkcji sprzętu wojskowego. To, co powinno wówczas wystąpić, to sprzężenie zwrotne pomiędzy wydatkami wojskowymi a stanem gospodarki. Zasadniczym celem artykułu jest zbadanie wskazanej odwrotnej relacji na poziomie krajów przy użyciu niezrównoważonego zestawu danych panelowych obejmującego 173 kraje w latach 1949–2020. Zaprezentowana analiza empiryczna wskazuje, że badana relacja sprzężenia zwrotnego między wydatkami wojskowymi a wzrostem gospodarczym jest albo całkowicie nieobecna, albo co najwyżej bardzo słaba.
 
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