PRACA ORYGINALNA
Wykorzystanie nowego instrumentu do lokalnego pomiaru wpływu prywatyzacji na wyniki przedsiębiorstw
Jan Hagemejer 1, 2  
,   Joanna Tyrowicz 3, 4, 5  
 
Więcej
Ukryj
1
University of Warsaw, Poland
2
CASE - Center of Social and Economic Research, Poland
3
University of Warsaw, Faculty of Management, Poland
4
FAME|GRAPE, Warsaw, Poland
5
IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany
AUTOR DO KORESPONDENCJI
Jan Hagemejer   

Uniwersity of Warsaw, Polska
Data nadesłania: 26-11-2019
Data ostatniej rewizji: 24-03-2020
Data akceptacji: 16-07-2020
Data publikacji: 30-09-2020
 
GNPJE 2020;303(3):35–52
 
SŁOWA KLUCZOWE
KODY KLASYFIKACJI JEL
STRESZCZENIE ARTYKUŁU
Pomimo istnienia w literaturze ewidentnego konsensusu, że prywatyzacja jednoznacznie prowadzi do wzrostu produktywności i zyskowności przedsiębiorstw, problem obciążenia estymatorów wywołany endogenicznością jest znaczny, co potwierdzają liczne metaanalizy. W artykule zaproponowano nową metodę rozwiązującą problem endogeniczności, którą stosuje się do danych o uniwersum polskich średnich i dużych przedsiębiorstw w latach 1995–2008. Rezultaty estymacji wskazują, że wywołana prywatyzacją poprawa wyników przedsiębiorstw widoczna jest jedynie w niektórych ich grupach.
 
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