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PRACA ORYGINALNA
Transfery wyrównawcze i opodatkowanie lokalne. Przypadek Polski
 
Więcej
Ukryj
1
Department of Public Finance, Poznań University of Economics and Business, Poland
 
 
Data nadesłania: 04-01-2023
 
 
Data ostatniej rewizji: 05-04-2023
 
 
Data akceptacji: 12-05-2023
 
 
Data publikacji: 30-06-2023
 
 
Autor do korespondencji
Monika Banaszewska   

Department of Public Finance, Poznań University of Economics and Business, Poland
 
 
GNPJE 2023;314(2):47-65
 
SŁOWA KLUCZOWE
KODY KLASYFIKACJI JEL
H71
H77
 
STRESZCZENIE
W artykule dane na temat dochodów z tytułu opodatkowania nieruchomości osiąganych przez gminy w Polsce w latach 2005–2017 wykorzystano do ustalenia, czy transfer wyrównawczy zniechęca do gromadzenia dochodów własnych. Pytanie to znajduje się w centrum zainteresowania osób odpowiedzialnych za konstruowanie systemu wyrównywania dochodów jednostek samorządowych. Nieciągła zmiana w systemie wyrównawczym umożliwia zastosowanie podejścia quasi-eksperymentalnego (metody podwójnej różnicy). Okazuje się, że wzrost stopy wyrównywania pionowego prowadzi do spadku wysiłku fiskalnego gmin – beneficjentów transferu wyrównawczego. Udokumentowany jest również efekt dochodowy rozpatrywanych części subwencji ogólnej. Rezultaty badania wskazują, że zmiany w otoczeniu instytucjonalnym wywołują trwałe zmiany w lokalnych politykach fiskalnych. Co więcej, okazało się, że efekt wzmacnia się po kilku latach i pozostaje istotny w średnim okresie. Wskazuje to na fakt, że jakiekolwiek modyfikacje subcentralnych ram fiskalnych powinny być poprzedzone gruntownymi analizami i konsultacjami.
PODZIĘKOWANIA
Autorka wyraża wdzięczność za wsparcie otrzymane od Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (DAAD).
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