RESEARCH PAPER
Why Do Regimes Arise and Persist? Belarus and the Theory of Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson
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1
Department of History of Economics, University of Lodz, Poland
2
Institute of Geography and Spatial Organization, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, Poland
Submission date: 2023-07-11
Final revision date: 2023-12-12
Acceptance date: 2024-01-07
Publication date: 2024-03-28
GNPJE 2024;317(1):19-33
KEYWORDS
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ABSTRACT
The Eastern European state of Belarus, a former Soviet republic, is classified as a pure autocracy, and 2024 marks three decades since its strongman leader Alexander Lukashenko came to power. Over the years, Lukashenko has created a unique type of economy synergistic with the political system and known as “state capitalism.” In this paper, we refer to the theories of Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson to explore the factors and institutions that facilitated Lukashenko’s rise to power and ensure the durability of the Belarusian authoritarian system. We found that the case of Belarus is unique and holds relevance for post-Soviet studies, deviating in some respects from Acemoglu and Robinson’s theory, especially regarding the dictator’s ascent to power and the factors sustaining the system. We hypothesise that culture and mental models were crucial for Lukashenko to take power, while the system’s persistence is, in large part, due to the dictator’s external protector, Russia. We use historical analysis and evaluate economic and institutional development indicators.
FUNDING
This article is based on research funded by Poland’s National Centre for Research and Development (NCBR) under the scientific project “Belarus and Poland: From the Historical Roots of Political and Economic Systems to Institutional Planning for Development” (Narodowe Centrum Badań i Rozwoju, No. SzN/I/39/BaP/2022).
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