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RESEARCH PAPER
Differences in the Composition of Management and Supervisory Boards in Polish Joint-Stock Companies
1
Katedra Makroekonomii i Badań nad Rozwojem, Instytut Ekonomii, Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny w Poznaniu, Polska
Submission date: 2021-05-25
Final revision date: 2021-08-16
Acceptance date: 2022-01-04
Publication date: 2022-03-31
GNPJE 2022;309(1):79-95
KEYWORDS
JEL CLASSIFICATION CODES
ABSTRACT
This paper aims to describe the characteristics of members of management and
supervisory boards in 6,489 joint-stock companies registered in the Polish National
Court Register from 2001 to 2017 and to highlight differences between companies
depending on their ownership structure: private vs. state-owned. We analysed
features such as the term of office, gender, age, and nationality. The average
term of a management board is two years and three months. In state-owned
enterprises (SOE), this period is several days shorter. Meanwhile, supervisory
boards have terms of two years and six months on average. In private companies,
the term of office is two months longer than in SOEs. The average board member
was 43.5 years old when appointed in private companies and about 45 years old
in SOEs. Men predominate in the boardrooms. Comparing management boards, the underrepresentation
of women is greater in SOEs. Meanwhile, in the case of
private companies, women are more underrepresented on the supervisory boards.
We show that the features of board members are statistically significant depending
on the ownership structure, but these differences are not large.
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