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RESEARCH PAPER
Corporate Governance and the Cost Effectiveness of Warsaw Stock Exchange-Listed Banks
1
Uniwersytet Łódzki, Wydział Ekonomiczno-Socjologiczny, Katedra Ekonomii Instytucjonalnej
Submission date: 2018-08-22
Acceptance date: 2019-01-16
Publication date: 2019-03-21
GNPJE 2019;297(1):111-133
KEYWORDS
JEL CLASSIFICATION CODES
ABSTRACT
The global financial crisis of 2008–2010 undermined confidence in companies operating in the banking sector. Corporate governance systems in banks have been blamed as ineffective and pinpointed as a driving force behind the crisis. In response, international and national regulatory authorities have issued a number of guidelines to improve the effectiveness of supervisory mechanisms. In this article, the author verifies the influence of selected corporate governance standards and characteristics on the effectiveness of banks listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE). The research results confirm a statistically significant effect of mechanisms defined as corporate governance “best practices” and factors related to the size of a bank and its management. In particular, this study shows that there is a negative association between fraction of independent members of supervisory board and the cost effectiveness of WSE-listed banks.
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