RESEARCH PAPER
Student Mobility and Sorting of Students
Paweł Bukowski 1, 2  
 
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1
Institute of Economics, Polish Academy of Sciences, Poland
2
Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and Political Science, United Kingdom
CORRESPONDING AUTHOR
Paweł Bukowski   

Instytut Nauk Ekonomicznych, Polska Akademia Nauk, Polska
Submission date: 2020-05-01
Final revision date: 2020-07-17
Acceptance date: 2020-07-21
Publication date: 2020-09-30
 
GNPJE 2020;303(3):5–34
 
KEYWORDS
JEL CLASSIFICATION CODES
ABSTRACT
This study investigates whether improving student mobility leads to greater sorting of students between schools and classes. I isolate an exogenous change in student mobility using the two-stage design of the Polish comprehensive education system and differences in school density across geographic areas. I construct a novel measure of student homogeneity based on Raven’s Progressive Matrix test score. One finding is that higher mobility leads to greater sorting of students between schools. Another, more novel, result shows that mobility also leads to higher sorting within a school (across classes). I provide suggestive evidence that demand for peer quality among students motivates school principals to create selective tracks within comprehensive schools.
 
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