PL EN
RESEARCH PAPER
On the Relationship Between Civil Liberties and Socio-Economic Development in Post-Socialist States
Anna Lewczuk 1  
 
More details
Hide details
1
Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw, Poland
CORRESPONDING AUTHOR
Anna Lewczuk   

Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw, Długa 44/50, 00-241 Warsaw, Poland
Submission date: 2020-12-16
Final revision date: 2021-02-27
Acceptance date: 2021-03-18
Publication date: 2021-06-29
 
GNPJE 2021;306(2):5–29
 
KEYWORDS
JEL CLASSIFICATION CODES
ABSTRACT
This paper addresses the relationship between civil liberties and socio-economic development in post-socialist states in Central and Eastern Europe. Our analysis focuses on three categories of civil liberties: private civil liberties, political civil liberties, and physical integrity rights. The methodology used in the study consists of a panel vector autoregressive model. Our results imply that GDP growth in post-socialist states positively reacts to changes in civil liberties, while civil liberties positively react to changes in GDP growth. Moreover, the outcomes of the model suggest the presence of various intermediaries in the relationship between civil liberties and economic development in post-socialist states. These are domestic investment, foreign direct investment, total factor productivity, and judicial independence.
 
REFERENCES (39)
1.
Andrews D. W., Lu B. [2001], Consistent model and moment selection procedures for GMM estimation with application to dynamic panel data models, Journal of Econometrics, 101 (1): 123–164.
 
2.
Antonakakis N., Cunado J., Filis G., De Gracia F. P. [2017], Oil dependence, quality of political institutions and economic growth: A panel VAR approach, Resources Policy, 53: 147–163.
 
3.
Bénassy-Quéré A., Coupet M., Mayer T. [2007], Institutional determinants of foreign direct investment, The World Economy, 30 (5): 764–782.
 
4.
Bjørnskov C., Méon P. G. [2013], Is trust the missing root of institutions, education, and development? Public Choice, 157 (3–4): 641–669.
 
5.
Blume L., Voigt S. [2007], The economic effects of human rights, Kyklos, 60 (4): 509–538.
 
6.
Berggren N., Gutmann J. [2020], Securing personal freedom through institutions: the role of electoral democracy and judicial independence, European Journal of Law and Economics: 1–22.
 
7.
Canova F., Ciccarelli M. [2013], Panel Vector Autoregressive Models: A Survey, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
 
8.
Chang H. J. [2002], Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective, Anthem Press.
 
9.
Chang H. J. [2011], Institutions and economic development: theory, policy and history, Journal of Institutional Economics, 7 (4): 473–498.
 
10.
Chilton A. S., Versteeg M. [2015], Do Constitutional Rights Make a Difference? University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper, 694: 2014–2043.
 
11.
Coppedge M., Gerring J., Knutsen C. H., Lindberg S. I., Teorell J., Altman D., Bernhard M., Fish M. S., Glynn A., Hicken A., Lührmann A., Marquardt K. L., McMann K., Paxton P., Pemstein D., Seim B., Sigman R., Skaaning S. E., Staton J., Cornell A., Gastaldi L., Gjerløw H., Mechkova V., von Römer J., Sundtröm A., Tzelgov E., Uberti L., Wang Y., Wig T., Ziblatt D. [2019], “V–Dem Codebook v9”, Varieties of Democracy (VDem) Project.
 
12.
Crabtree C., Nelson M. J. [2017], New evidence for a positive relationship between de facto judicial independence and state respect for empowerment rights, International Studies Quarterly, 61 (1): 210–224.
 
13.
Ezer T. [2004], A positive right to protection for children, Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev. LJ, 7: 1.
 
14.
Farber D. A. [2002], Rights as signals, The Journal of Legal Studies, 31 (1): 83–98.
 
15.
Feenstra R. C., Inklaar R., Timmer M. P. [2015], The Next Generation of the Penn World Table, American Economic Review, 105 (10): 3150–3182.
 
16.
Fish M. S. [1997], The determinants of economic reform in the post-communist world, East European Politics and Societies, 12 (1): 31–78.
 
17.
Góes C. [2016], Institutions and growth: A GMM/IV panel VAR approach, Economics Letters, 138: 85–91.
 
18.
Gorodnichenko Y., Roland G. [2017], Culture, institutions, and the wealth of nations, Review of Economics and Statistics, 99 (3): 402–416.
 
19.
Granger C. W. [1980], Testing for causality: a personal viewpoint, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2: 329–352.
 
20.
Hall R. E., Jones C. I. [1999], Why do some countries produce so much more output per worker than others? The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114 (1): 83–116.
 
21.
Hayek F. [1976], Law, Legislation and Liberty, Vol. 2: The Mirage of Social Justice, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
 
22.
Henkin, L. [1990], The Age of Rights, Columbia University Press.
 
23.
Holtz-Eakin D., Newey W., Rosen H. S. [1988], Estimating vector autoregressions with panel data, Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society: 1371–1395.
 
24.
Inglehart R., Baker W. E. [2000], Modernization, cultural change, and the persistence of traditional values, American Sociological Review: 19–51.
 
25.
Keith L. C., Tate C. N., Poe S. C. [2009], Is the law a mere parchment barrier to human rights abuse?, The Journal of Politics, 71 (2): 644–660.
 
26.
Kwok C. C., Tadesse S. [2006], The MNC as an agent of change for host-country institutions: FDI and corruption, Journal of International Business Studies, 37 (6): 767–785.
 
27.
Maziarz M. [2015], A review of the Granger-causality fallacy, The Journal of Philosophical Economics: Reflections on Economic and Social Issues, 8 (2): 86–105.
 
28.
Melton J. [2013], Do constitutional rights matter? The relationship between de jure and de facto human rights protection: 1–39, working paper.
 
29.
Metelska-Szaniawska K. [2009], Constitutions and economic reforms in transition: an empirical study, Constitutional Political Economy, 20 (1): 1–41.
 
30.
Nickell S. [1981], Biases in dynamic models with fixed effects, Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society: 1417–1426.
 
31.
Nikolova M. [2016], Minding the happiness gap: Political institutions and perceived quality of life in transition, European Journal of Political Economy, 45: 129–148.
 
32.
North D. C. [1991], Institutions, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5 (1): 97–112.
 
33.
Orend B. [2002], Human Rights: Concept and Context, Broadview Press.
 
34.
Qian Y., Roland G. [1998], Federalism and the soft budget constraint. American Economic Review: 1143–1162.
 
35.
Rodrik D., Subramanian A., Trebbi F. [2004], Institutions rule: the primacy of institutions over geography and integration in economic development, Journal of Economic Growth, 9 (2): 131–165.
 
36.
Sen A. [2001], Development as Freedom, Oxford Paperbacks.
 
37.
World Bank [2020], World Development Indicators.
 
38.
Venard B. [2013], Institutions, corruption and sustainable development, Economics Bulletin, 33 (4): 2545–2562.
 
39.
Voigt S., Gutmann J., Feld L. P. [2015], Economic growth and judicial independence, a dozen years on: Cross-country evidence using an updated set of indicators, European Journal of Political Economy, 38: 197–211.
 
eISSN:2300-5238
ISSN:0867-0005