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RESEARCH PAPER
Neoclassical Economics’ Immunisation Strategies Against Behavioural Economics: Popper’s Perspective
1
Wroclaw University of Economics and Business, Poland
Submission date: 2024-03-10
Final revision date: 2024-06-04
Acceptance date: 2024-07-08
Publication date: 2024-12-21
GNPJE 2024;320(4):51-73
KEYWORDS
JEL CLASSIFICATION CODES
ABSTRACT
Although neoclassical economics faces frequent criticism, it remains the dominant paradigm, largely due to its immunisation strategies that rely on unfalsifiable concepts of utility and rationality. In this paper, I use Karl Popper’s philosophy to assess whether these strategies are justified. Firstly, I reconstruct Popper’s ideas on immunisation strategies, situational analysis, the rationality principle, and the metaphysical research programme. Next, I examine how neoclassical economics’ immunisation strategies counter critiques from behavioural economics. I conclude that neoclassical economics’ method does not produce empirical conjectures. I assess and evaluate this finding in relation to the “rationality principle”, as it parallels neoclassical economics’ optimisation axiom. Furthermore, I explore Popper’s relevance in the context of neoclassical economics’ recent incorporation of behavioural economics’ insights to show that my analysis is not purely historical.
FUNDING
This work was supported by the Scientific Research Support Fund of the Faculty of Economics and Finance at the Wroclaw University of Economics. MPK: B701210.
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